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Abstract
According to a popular argument in economics, the gender wage gap persists not because of employ-
er discrimination against women, but because of the differential investment of fathers and mothers
into paid work and the household. We test this argument by comparing the evolution of wages be-
tween men and women before the onset of family formation and gendered household specialization.
We use a cohort study of young adults for Switzerland (TREE 2000–2014) and match the two sexes on
their intellectual ability and educational attainment before they enter the labour market. We then use
the ensuing survey waves to account for human capital and job characteristics as well as for values to-
wards work and family. We replicate our analysis with a second panel study of Swiss graduate stu-
dents. We find in both cohort studies an unexplained gender wage gap of between 3 to 6 percent in fa-
vour of men. This result suggests that young women earn lower wages than young men with the
same productive characteristics long before they have children. Translated into annual wages, this
means that young women lose out on half a monthly wage each year in comparison to young men.
Introduction
Over the last few decades, women have made up ground
with respect to men in key areas of social life, from edu-
cational enrolment to political representation. However,
one area where progress is slow and the gender gap per-
sistent are wages, with women still earning substantially
less than men (OECD, 2012; Blau and Kahn, 2017).
According to an influential argument in economics, the
earnings trajectory of men and women diverges because
of the division of labour within families, with fathers
specializing in paid employment and mothers focussing
on housekeeping and child-rearing (Becker, 1985;
Polachek, 2006). In anticipation of their future family
roles, young men and women may choose different fields
of study and take up work in different occupations.
Following this argument, the gender wage gap persists
not because of employer discrimination against women,
but because of the differential investment of men and
women into paid work and the household.
Our article tests the family roles argument by analyz-
ing the wages of a birth cohort of childless young men
and women up to the age of 30. This allows us to com-
pare the evolution of wages before the onset of gendered
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household specialization. If unequal wages are exclu-
sively caused by differential investment into employment
and child-rearing, we should not observe, for a given
level of education, field of study and occupation, a gen-
der wage gap before men and women have children. On
the contrary, an unexplained gender wage gap among
childless workers points to discriminatory wage-setting
and suggests that young women continue to earn lower
wages than young men despite comparable skills
(OECD, 2012: p. 172).
Wage discrimination is not only detrimental to
women, but should also be disadvantageous to discrim-
inatory employers because they reward workers for
characteristics that have no bearing on productivity.
Accordingly, Gary Becker (1957) expected discrimin-
ation to be a transitory phenomenon in competitive la-
bour markets as discriminatory employers would
eventually be driven out of business (see Pager, 2016).
We examine this argument and analyze the gender wage
gap for one of the most competitive labour markets in
Europe, Switzerland. In Switzerland, unemployment is
low, work migration high, employment protection
weak, there is no legal minimum wage and collective
wage-bargaining covers less than half of the workforce
(Murphy and Oesch, 2018). Following Becker’s argu-
ment, it should be particularly hard to find wage dis-
crimination in Switzerland.
Our paper makes three contributions. First, it provides
a comprehensive test of the argument that, as titled by the
New York Times, ‘the gender pay gap is largely because
of motherhood’ (13. 5. 2017). It does so by analyzing
early careers with a unique panel dataset for Switzerland,
called ‘Transitions from Education to Employment’
(TREE) which follows a Programme for International
Student Assessment (PISA) cohort of young people from
the age of 15 up to the age of 30 (9 waves). Our analysis
explicitly accounts for the anticipation of family forma-
tion by excluding the wage observations of individuals
who have children in later waves and by controlling for
school leavers’ attitudes towards work and family.
Second, we use this cohort study to show how the
earnings of young men and women are affected by three
channels that partly overlap with different career stages:
by initial educational credentials, the subsequent labour-
market behaviour and the anticipation of future family
roles. We disentangle the influence of these three mecha-
nisms by first matching men and women on a long list of
pre-market characteristics such as social origin and edu-
cation attainment. We then add control variables for
their employment choices and family anticipation.
Third, we provide evidence for the robustness of our
results by replicating our analysis with a second panel
study, the Swiss graduate survey. This panel study contains
the earnings of young men and women 1 and 5 years after
they graduated from tertiary education. The two datasets
provide us with detailed measures for school degrees, job
characteristics, and value orientations. If women earn
lower wages because their fields of study are less rewarding
(Ochsenfeld, 2014) or their jobs require less effort (Becker,
1985: p. 52), our analysis will pick up these effects.
Our article first discusses the sources of the gender
wage gap by contrasting the two arguments of gendered
household division of labour and pay discrimination. It
then presents the institutional context, data, and match-
ing method of our analysis. The results section shows
the wage trajectories of young men and women with
both random- and fixed-effects models and presents the
findings of a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition analysis.
The conclusion discusses the policy implications of a
persistent gender wage gap.
The Gender Wage Gap and the Household
Division of Labour
Traditionally, the gender wage gap has been explained
by differences in human capital between men and
women (Becker, 1985). Yet over the last decades, educa-
tional attainment between men and women has con-
verged across the western world, and in a growing
number of countries the gender gap in university com-
pletion has reversed from favouring men to favouring
women (DiPrete and Buchmann, 2013: p. 32). The fact
that gender differences in education—and in work ex-
perience (Goldin, 2014: p. 1093)—narrowed much
more than the gender wage gap has been ‘an embarrass-
ment to the human capital interpretation of sexual earn-
ings differentials’ (Becker, 1985: p. 35) and called for an
adaption of the theory.
The human capital explanation of the gender wage
gap therefore shifted its focus to the household division of
labour. The argument is that in anticipation of parent-
hood, men specialize in paid work and continue to invest
in their job-specific skills, whereas women specialize in
child care and choose family friendly jobs which demand
less effort and less intensive training (Becker, 1985: p. 36).
If young women expect more discontinuous work careers
as a consequence of their future family responsibilities,
they may choose fields of study and occupations that are
less rewarding, but more easily compatible with child-
rearing (Blau and Kahn, 2017: p. 817). Once the children
are born, mothers tend to spend more time out of the la-
bour force, accumulate less work experience, have shorter
working hours, are less likely to get promoted and experi-
ence lower earnings growth over time (Gangl and Ziefle,
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2009: p. 355). In short, due to the gendered division of la-
bour within the family, women may commit less time and
energy to the labour market than men.
There is ample evidence for the negative effect of children
on women’s labour supply and wages. Mothers tend to earn
less than non-mothers (e.g. Budig and England, 2001; Gangl
and Ziefle, 2009; Oesch et al., 2017) and having children
slows down wage growth for women, but not for men (e.g.
Marini and Fan, 1997; Fuller, 2008). Consequently,
accounting for marriage and children reduces the gender
wage gap (Aisenbrey and Bru¨ckner, 2008: p. 643).
Some scholars have interpreted these findings as provid-
ing evidence that the gender wage gap is solely rooted in
joint household decisions. An influential proponent is
Solomon Polachek, co-author of James Heckman and Jacob
Mincer, who writes in a book edited by Francine Blau and
David Grusky that ‘I go as far as to argue that this detrimen-
tal [household] division of labour is at the root of almost all
the [gender] wage gap’ (Polachek, 2006 [2004]: p. 27).
According to this view, the gender wage gap basically sums
up to a gap between men, who invest in labour-market
skills, and mothers, who invest in child-rearing skills. This
argument has also gained political traction as it conveniently
shifts the focus from employers to households and has been
widely echoed by newspapers and think tanks.1
The Wage Gap in Early-Careers as Crucial
Test
The implications of this argument are far from trivial.
If the gender wage gap is better termed a family wage
gap, the political initiatives to subdue wage discrimin-
ation against women are bound to fail—simply because
there is no discriminatory wage-setting by employers in
the labour market. If there is any discrimination, it
relates to the non-market domain and couples’ decisions
on who specializes in paid work and who takes on re-
sponsibility for domestic work.
The ideal test for this argument is to focus on early-
career outcomes. Unmarried and childless young men and
women are not burdened with childcare. Of course, they
may anticipate parenthood and the gendered division of la-
bour and invest different amounts of time and energy into
their education and early work career. Yet to the extent
that young men and women possess similar levels of edu-
cation, work experience and on-the-job training and are
employed in comparable occupations and industries, they
should also earn the same wages. The family wage gap
should be of no concern to them—and not send them on
different earnings trajectories in their twenties.
What does the evidence on early careers tell us? For
the United States, Marini and Fan (1997: p. 599) show
an unexplained wage gap for young women and men
(ages 14–22) of 5 per cent (after controlling for race,
human capital, family structure, aspiration, occupation,
and industry). A larger wage gap is found for American
men and women in their late 20s, reaching 10 (Goldin,
2014: p. 1096) to 14 per cent (Fortin, 2008: p. 906) in
models controlling for human capital, education, labour
market experience, cognitive and non-cognitive skills,
personal characteristics as well as occupation and indus-
try. Comparable studies on young adults in Europe
show residual gender pay gaps that range between 5 and
10 per cent among university graduates in Germany
(Ochsenfeld, 2014: p. 544; Francesconi and Parey,
2018: p. 74), 7 per cent in a cross-section for
Switzerland (Bertschy et al., 2014: p. 297), 8 per cent in
the British Household Panel (Manning and Swaffield,
2008: p. 986), and 10 per cent in administrative data for
Finland (Napari, 2009: p. 140).
Clearly, the gender wage gap opens before family
formation sets in. This leads to the question of what
hides behind this ‘unexplained’ gender wage residual. A
recent focus has been on psychological characteristics
such as non-cognitive traits, the desire to compete or ne-
gotiation skills. Based on two American panel surveys,
Fortin (2008) finds that although there is convergence in
how important work is for young men and women, men
still tend to be more ambitious and value money more
than women. While this difference may account for one
to two percentage points of the gender wage gap, the un-
explained residual remains large (Fortin, 2008, see also
Manning and Swaffield, 2008).
Men and women may have different attitudes to-
wards work and family and these differences may, in
turn, translate into different wages through negotiation
skills. Evidence from both surveys and field experiments
suggests that men are more likely to initiate salary nego-
tiations (Babcock and Laschever, 2009). A large meta-
analysis cautiously concludes that men tend to achieve
better economic outcomes in negotiations than women,
although these gender differences strongly depend on
the context (Mazei et al., 2015). Moreover, negotiation
outcomes may be endogenous to entrenched wage differ-
entials: If women face discrimination in the labour mar-
ket that reduces their salaries relative to men’s, their
expected outcome from wage negotiations will be lower
than for men (Blau and Kahn, 2017: p. 843).
Wage Discrimination Against Women
In sociology, it is widely accepted that others factors
than productivity affect earnings, notably power resour-
ces such as trade unions and collective bargaining as
European Sociological Review, 2019, Vol. 0, No. 0 3
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well as social norms (Jacobs and Steinberg, 1990).
Of particular relevance for our study is the social norm
that grants men priority on the labour market.
Especially in conservative gender regimes such as in
Switzerland, men are encouraged to become breadwin-
ners and women secondary earners.2 This social norm is
shared by both employees and employers and thus likely
to translate into higher reference wages for men than
women (Lalive and Stutzer, 2010). Indeed, survey
experiments systematically show that respondents attri-
bute higher wages to men than women who possess
identical skills and credentials—be it in the United States
(Jasso and Webster, 1997), Germany (Auspurg, Hinz
Sauer, 2017), or Switzerland (Jann, 2003).
These results raise the issue of gender discrimination,
defined as unequal treatment of men and women on the
sole basis of their gender (Pager and Shepherd, 2008: p.
182). In theory, a distinction is often made between taste-
based discrimination—a dislike rooted in prejudice and
stereotypes—and statistical discrimination where recruiters
expect different groups to have different average productiv-
ity (Becker, 1957). In practice, the two types of discrimin-
ation may not be very different—because employers’
productivity estimates are based more on beliefs and stereo-
types than on statistical information about actual product-
ivity (Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs, 1999: p. 424). For
our definition of discrimination as unequal treatment on
the basis of gender, it does not matter whether the underly-
ing causes are stereotypes and/or statistical reasoning.
What matters more is that wage discrimination against
women is not a merely academic topic. Most Western
countries have legislation on equal pay—and this legisla-
tion leads to a multitude of grievances. The most telling ex-
ample is the United Kingdom where there were no less
than 145,000 equal pay claims over the period 2007–2010
(Gilbert, 2012: p. 138). Although only a minority of cases
is settled in favour of the female claimants—Deakin et al.
(2015: p. 385) quote a proportion of 20 per cent for 1976–
1998—the sheer numbers of claims suggest that wage dis-
crimination against women is far from anecdotal. While
the legal hurdles for equal pay claims are much higher in
Switzerland (Lempen and Voloder, 2017), nothing suggests
that the British labour market is an outlier. In 2010,
Britain’s raw gender pay gap was 18 per cent and thus
close to the OECD average of 16 per cent—and lower than
Switzerland’s gap of 20 per cent (OECD, 2012: p. 167).
Channels Through Which Family Roles
Affect Wages
Our goal is to analyze whether the gender wage gap is
solely due to family formation—men specializing in
labour-market skills and women in child-rearing skills—
or whether other mechanisms such as discrimination
also play a role. We therefore need to account for the
different channels through which family roles, and their
anticipation, may affect the wages of young men and
women. We distinguish three mechanisms.
A first channel relates to individuals’ investment into
education and skills before they enter the labour market.
The earnings potential of young men and women may
vary because of their social origin, intellectual ability,
level of education and, importantly, field of study. Field
of study is a central indicator of pre-market segregation.
Women may cluster in different fields because of
gendered socialization (Polavieja and Platt, 2014) or
because they anticipate part-time work and thus choose
fields that lead to family friendly (and low-paid) occupa-
tions (Ochsenfeld, 2014: p. 537).
While this first mechanism tells us whether men and
women enter the labour market with different skills and
credentials, a second channel relates to the subsequent
labour-market choices made by young adults. Gender
segregation in the labour market may lead young
women to take up employment in less rewarding occu-
pations and industries than young men (England,
Allison and Wu, 2007; Murphy and Oesch, 2016).
If young women anticipate career breaks, they may in-
vest less time in acquiring job-specific skills (Polavieja,
2008) and benefit less from employers’ on-the-job train-
ing (Evertsson, 2004). In addition, they may gain less
work experience than men, which is particularly rele-
vant because interruptions in the early career are costly
in terms of future earnings (Gangl and Ziefle, 2009;
Bertrand, Goldin and Katz, 2010).
A third channel relates to family formation.
Although we exclude observations of respondents 3
years prior to having children, parental roles may be
anticipated. If founding a family is a priority for many
young women and making a career a priority for many
young men, this may lead to differences in labour-
market behaviour that are unobserved—but which
should show in respondents’ attitudes towards work,
family, and partnership when they enter the job market.
Likewise, getting married may launch young men and
women on different wage trajectories if marriage is
interpreted by employers as a signal that their female
employees will soon depart on maternity leave.3
Our analytical strategy is to systematically account
for these influences of family formation on wages. We
account for the first mechanism of pre-market skills and
credentials by matching young men and women for their
ability, level, and field of education before they begin to
work. We account for the second mechanism of
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employment segregation by additionally controlling for
differences in labour-market behaviour such as occupa-
tion and industry, work experience and job-related
human capital. We then account for the third mechan-
ism of family formation by excluding from our analysis
the wage observations of individuals 3 years before they
have children and by additionally controlling for mar-
riage and respondents’ value orientations towards work,
family, and partnership prior to labour market entry.
If our data still show a substantial gender wage gap
after these three channels have been accounted for, we
need to conclude that this gap cannot be solely attrib-
uted to different family roles and their anticipation.
Institutional Context
We analyze the gender wage gap in early careers be-
tween men and women born in the mid-1980s. We do so
for Switzerland, a country that combines a liberal labour
market with a conservative gender regime. While the
Swiss labour market shares common features with
Austria and Germany such as the importance of voca-
tional education, the close link between education and
employment as well as collective bargaining set at the in-
dustry level, the institutions governing the employment
relations are substantially more market-liberal.
Employment protection is weak, coverage with collect-
ive bargaining low (below 50 per cent) and there is no
legal minimum wage (Murphy and Oesch, 2018). The
combination of market-liberal institutions, low levels of
unemployment and strong work migration results in a
very competitive labour market.
In terms of its gender regime, Switzerland clearly
belongs to the group of conservative countries. At the
national level, female suffrage was only introduced in
1971 and a gender-egalitarian marriage law brought
into practice as late as 1988. In the family policy index
developed by Mandel and Semyonov (2006: p. 1923),
Switzerland is at the bottom of the ranking due to its
gender-conservative welfare state, not far behind
Germany and the United States.
Data
Our analysis uses the first cohort of a nationally repre-
sentative dataset for Switzerland called ‘Transitions
from Education to Employment’ (TREE) (Gomensoro
and Meyer, 2017). This longitudinal survey follows a
youth cohort that participated in the PISA in 2000 when
students were in their last year of compulsory schooling
and thus around 16 years old. Individuals were surveyed
each subsequent year until the age of 23 (until wave 7).
Wave 8 was conducted 3 years later (at the age of
around 26) and wave 9 four years later (in 2014 when
respondents were around 30).
Using the TREE dataset has several advantages. It is
a cohort study that contains detailed information about
the educational pathways and job characteristics. In
addition, it is based on the PISA study in which pupils
take a standardized test in reading literacy, providing us
with information on respondents’ reading skills and
hence with a proxy for their general intellectual ability
(Duckworth, Quinn and Tsukayama, 2012).
The initial baseline sample of the first wave of TREE
consisted of 5,528 respondents. Over nine waves, attri-
tion reduced the number to 3,142 respondents. As we are
interested in individuals’ behaviour in the labour market
and thus need people to earn wages, we can only use 25
per cent of all observations (3,154 individuals and 6,875
observations). We determine the year of labour-market
entry, and thus the first relevant job, based on the infor-
mation that respondents had finished their full-time edu-
cation and worked at least 2 days full-time in their main
job as wage-earners. This leaves us with 3,043 individuals
and 6,676 observations. We further account for the possi-
bility that men and women anticipate family formation
by restricting our analytical sample to those wage obser-
vations that were measured at least 3 years before the
respondents had their first child (14 per cent of all
observations). Limiting our analytical sample to those
observations without missing values on all of our control
variables leaves us with an analytical sample of 1,862 per-
sons and 3,635 person-years.4
A drawback of the cohort design is that respondents
with tertiary education enter the labour market later
and therefore contribute fewer wage observations to the
analysis. This problem is heightened in TREE because
the time lags between waves increase after respondents
reach their mid-twenties. We therefore provide a robust-
ness check by resorting to a second longtiudinal survey,
the Swiss Graduate Survey. This cohort study only
includes individuals who finished higher education in
2008 and who were surveyed 1 and 5 years after the end
of their studies (in 2009 and 2013, respectively).
The Graduate Survey covers about the same time
period in which TREE respondents finished their tertiary
education. To make the two datasets as comparable as
possible, we restrict our analytical sample of the
Graduate Survey to individuals who are in the same
birth cohort as the individuals in TREE. Whenever pos-
sible, we use the same variables and operationalized
them in the same way as in TREE. The two waves of the
Graduate Survey provide us with complete observations
for the wages of 840 persons and 1,169 person-years
European Sociological Review, 2019, Vol. 0, No. 0 5
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Measures and Matching Method
Our dependent variable is the natural logarithm of
respondents’ gross monthly wage in Swiss Francs
(CHF), standardized for a full-time job (40 hours per
week) and adjusted for inflation.5 We exclude potential
outliers by dropping monthly wages that are implausibly
low (below 2,000 CHF) or high (above 20,000 CHF) for
a full-time job in people’s twenties.
The main challenge of our analysis is to compare the
wages of men and women who are as similar as possible
in terms of intellectual ability, human capital, and la-
bour market behaviour. Our solution is to match men
and women based on their socio-demographic and edu-
cational credentials before they enter the labour market.
We use the matching method of entropy balancing
(Hainmueller, 2012) which reweights the treatment and
control group by assigning scalar weights to each sample
unit so that the two groups match exactly on the speci-
fied moments of a set of covariates.6
We account for the first channel by matching men to
women on the basis of their socio-demographic charac-
teristics: age in months, place of birth in or outside of
Switzerland, years of residency in Switzerland, family
structure, respondents’ social origin as measured with
ISEI of both parents, and cultural capital.7 We then
match men to women based on their educational ability
by using the plausible PISA reading literacy scores, the
school track attended in 9th grade as well as the num-
ber, type and field of the educational certificates
achieved before entering the labour market.8 The final
matching weight was calculated by simultaneously
including all the variables used in the previous weights.
Supplementary Table W.1 shows that our matched
groups of men and women look very much alike.
While we account for the first channel by using a
matching method, we use a regression approach to add
further variables in later waves that relate to the two sub-
sequent channels. The second channel relates to the labour
market where we control for further educational certifi-
cates, previous work experience before they entered the la-
bour market (such as work experience in student jobs in
months) and the number of jobs held so far (with an add-
itional squared term as many job switches may send a
negative signal). We determine the characteristics of the
current job with a large selection of measures, notably oc-
cupation (10 ISCO groups) and industry (19 sectors).9
We use three indices on self-reported job characteris-
tics to account for Becker’s assumption that women
choose employment that is less strenuous and demand-
ing: (i) strain in work environment (such as dust, uncom-
fortable temperatures, insufficient set-up of the
workplace), (ii) variety of tasks (possibility to learn new
things, diversified tasks, skills can be applied fully);
(iii) autonomy (influence about job tasks, possibility to
choose solutions, possibility to work independently).
The third channel relates to the anticipation of family
formation. We control for marriage (and an interaction
between marriage and gender) as a potential signal to
employers that the respondent may soon have children.
Moreover, we account for respondents’ attitudes to-
wards work, partnership, and family by using three indi-
ces developed by Watermann (2000). These attitudes are
measured before individuals enter the labour market (as
an average over the waves preceding labour market
entry). Although it is not uncommon to include attitudes
in wage equations (see Fortin, 2008: pp. 885–886,
Manning and Swaffield, 2008: p. 1014), they should
only be relevant for earnings if they translate into con-
crete behaviour: into educational choices and labour
market behaviour. Supplementary Table W.2 provides
the descriptive statistics for all the variables.
Analytical Strategy
In our longitudinal data, wage observations are measured
repeatedly for the same individuals. We account for this
nested data structure and the non-independence of wage
observations over time by estimating a random-effects
model. We use the years of experience as time variable
and the interaction of experience with sex in order to
examine whether wage growth differs between the sexes.
Fixed-effects models would be preferable in order to
limit unobserved heterogeneity. Yet since sex does not
change over time, it is impossible to estimate such a
within-effect. Still, we run fixed-effects models with
interactions between sex and all independent variables
to allow for the possibility that certain characteristics
lead to higher wage returns for one sex than the other.
Finally, we use a 2-fold Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
with coefficients based on a pooled regression over both
groups (e.g. Oaxaca, 1973; Jann, 2008) in order to as-
sess how much of the gender wage gap can be attributed
to different skills and jobs—and how much is due to
other unobserved sources. In order to base the decom-
position on the largest number of wage observation pos-
sible, we use for each individual the first wage
observation in their first year on the labour market. All
our analyses are weighted with the survey weights.10
Results on the Gender Wage Gap
Figure 1 presents the mean earnings of men and women
in their early career over different waves and thus for
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different ages (left-hand panel) as well as for different
durations of work experience (right-hand panel). In the
left-hand panel, we see that except for the entry age of
18.5 years, men earn more than women for all ages.
While the difference is sizeable between 19.5 and
21.5 years, it is small for the latter ages and not statistic-
ally significant. However, the individuals in our cohort
vary in their years of education and do not enter the la-
bour market at the same age. The left-hand panel thus
does not properly distinguish between wage growth due
to experience and wage growth due to the later entry in
the labour market of individuals with higher education.
Therefore, we examine wage growth over the first 5
years of labour market experience in the right-hand
panel. We censor work experience after 5 years to avoid
a sample selection bias because few individuals in our
sample have more work experience than 5 years—and
they tend to be a selected group of early school leavers
with lower educational degrees. Again, we find men to
have consistently higher wages than women from the
start of their career. The difference widens after 2 years
of work experience and becomes statistically significant,
but decreases again after 4 years.
As these descriptive analyses compare men and
women who enter the labour market at different ages,
with different educational degrees and different amounts
of work experience, we need to analyze the wage gap in
a multivariate setting. Table 1 shows the key coefficients
of a random intercept model that matches men to
women based on their socio-demographic characteristics
and educational attainment as explained above (for all
coefficients, see Supplementary Table W.3).
The baseline model 0 simply presents the estimates
from the random-effects model without any matching or
independent variables. It shows a raw wage gap of 5.4
per cent in favour of men. When introducing work ex-
perience as a measurement of time, we find a gender
wage gap of 4.7 per cent in favour of men. If we match
the male sample to the female sample according to their
social origin in model 1.1 and their intellectual ability in
model 1.2, the wage gap in favour of men increases to
7.2 per cent (model 1.1) and 8.8 per cent (model 1.2) re-
spectively because young women tend to have higher
cultural capital and better reading abilities. Matching on
the educational certificates before they enter the labour
market leaves the gender wage gap at 8.8 per cent
(model 1.3) as women have on average higher educa-
tional credentials than men. However, if we account for
the fields of study (or fields of vocational training), the
wage gap drops to 4.5 per cent (model 1.4). This may be
due because men choose more rewarding fields of
study—or because male-dominated occupations are
Figure 1. Mean earnings of men and women over the early career (with 95 per cent confidence intervals)
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better paid (Murphy and Oesch, 2016). If we finally
match the two sexes on all the 15 variables assessed be-
fore they enter the labour market, we find an unex-
plained wage gap of 4 per cent.
We account for the second channel by adding varia-
bles that measure job-related human capital. The wage
gap amounts to 4.6 per cent (model 2.1). When includ-
ing the characteristics of the current job (but removing
job-related human capital), the gender wage gap remains
basically unchanged at 4.4 per cent (model 2.2). Clearly,
the demands and strains of a job do not explain why
young men earn higher wages than young women.
When including all the variables related to models 1
(education) and 2 (labour market), the gender wage gap
is 4.8 per cent (model 2.3). This complete model
accounts for all the (observed) variables directly related
to work productivity—education, skills, and job charac-
teristics—and thus probably corresponds to the model
that would be used for the determination of equal pay
between the sexes.
We account for the third channel by including varia-
bles that directly relate to the anticipation of parenthood
such as marriage (interacted with gender) and attitudes
towards work and the family. When interpreting these
models, please note that equal pay commissions would
be unlikely to consider values and civil status as legitim-
ate determinants of wages. When accounting for mar-
riage, we find a gender wage gap of 4.0 per cent (model
3.1). If we add values towards work, family and partner-
ship (but remove marriage), the unexplained wage gap
in favour of men reduces to 3.2 per cent (model 3.2).
The joint information on marriage and values also leaves
us with a gap of 3.2 per cent (model 3.3). Finally, if we
add all the variables of channels 1–3 in the same model,
we find a gender wage gap of 3.6 per cent (model 4).
In terms of wage growth, our models show that each
additional year of work experience is rewarded, all else
equal, with an increase of about 3 per cent. The inter-
action effect of experience with gender is very small and
not statistically significant. This suggests that wages
evolve in parallel for men and women over the first few
years of work experience.
Robustness Tests
Given the statistical controversy over the question of the
gender wage gap (Blau and Kahn, 2017: p. 832), we run
several sensitivity tests to see whether our results are ro-
bust (see Table A1 in the appendix). When estimating
our model without outliers in wages, large matching
weights, or influential observations, the wage gap gets
slightly larger. In contrast, omitting the sampling
weights reduces the wage gap. However, the results re-
main basically unchanged. If we further use different
matching weights—weights in which women are bal-
anced on men’s characteristics (rather than men on
women’s characteristics)—the gender wage gap in model
4 increases to 6.4 per cent. This suggests that the wage
gaps reported in Table 1 of between 3.6 (model 4) and
4.8 per cent (model 2.3) may be lower-level estimates.
In a next step, we analyze the earnings of young men
and women with a different dataset, the Swiss Graduate
Survey that followed school leavers 1 and 5 years after
they had obtained a degree in higher education. By repli-
cating our analysis for the same birth cohort, but a data-
set that only includes people with tertiary education, we
take into account that these individuals contribute fewer
wage observations to TREE because they enter the la-
bour market in later waves. While TREE provides us
with a richer set of controls, the Graduate survey
reduces heterogeneity between men and women by cov-
ering one single educational and birth cohort: individu-
als of the same age who had obtained a tertiary degree
in the same year.
We estimate again a random-effects model where we
match men and women on initial socio-demographic
characteristics and intellectual potential (notably final
grades) and then add control variables for the type and
field of education as well as job characteristics. The
results for the Graduate survey show a coefficient of 4.8
per cent in favour of men (see last column of Table 1).
The gender wage gap among graduates from higher edu-
cation thus resembles the 4–5 per cent obtained for the
general youth population found with TREE.
With the exception of work experience which we
interacted with gender, our random-effects models as-
sume that men and women are rewarded identically for
all their characteristics (such as a given education or oc-
cupation). We thus run separate fixed-effects models for
gender to account for (time-constant) unobserved het-
erogeneity among men and women. We do so by includ-
ing interaction terms between gender and all time-
varying covariates. These results also suggest that the
initial years of work experience lead to comparable
wage returns for men and women (see Table A2 in the
appendix). While men have higher wages than women
from the onset of their career, the evolution of wages
does not seem to differ over the first few years of work
experience.
Decomposition of the Gender Wage Gap
In a last analysis, we turn to the Blinder-Oaxaca decom-
position method and distinguish the proportion of the
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gender wage gap that is attributable to the unequal en-
dowment with productive characteristics between the
sexes (the explained part of the gender wage gap) and
the proportion that is due to men getting higher rewards
for the same productive characteristics (the unexplained
part of the gender wage gap) (see Figure 2 and
Supplementary Table W.4). For this analysis, we added
the measures on which we matched men and women as
independent variables in order to be able to quantify
their contribution to the gender wage gap. For each indi-
vidual, wages correspond to the first year of labour mar-
ket experience.
Consistent with most of the random-effects models
shown in Table 1 above, we find a gender wage gap of
4.9 per cent. The explained part is small (1.4 percent-
age points). The only observable attribute that makes a
significant difference are job characteristics: Young men
work in jobs that are more rewarding than jobs held by
women. All the other attributes turn out to be not statis-
tically significant, although they suggest that young
women should earn higher wages based on obtaining
more human capital after labour market entry.
However, the main result of Table 1 is that men and
women born in the 1980s differ little in terms of human
capital and labour market behaviour before they have
children. This leaves us puzzling over the reasons behind
the gender wage gap.
Conclusion
This article examined the argument that men and wom-
en’s wage trajectories do not diverge prior to family for-
mation. For this reason, we analyzed the wages of a birth
cohort of young men and women over the first years of
their career, before families are formed and partners spe-
cialize in either care or paid work. Our argument is that
if unequal wages are exclusively caused by differential in-
vestment into employment and child-rearing, we should
not observe, for a given skill-set and job, a gender wage
gap before men and women have children.
Our evidence does not support the idea that the gen-
der wage gap is solely explained by family formation.
Our two panel datasets show that the gender wage gap
already exists at the start of the career—and neither edu-
cational attainment nor labour market choices explain
this disparity. We match the two sexes on their initial
productive potential, we control for multiple differences
in job characteristics and we even account for the pres-
ence of children, marriage and attitudes towards work
and family—three features that equal pay commissions
would certainly deem inadmissible. Whatever we do, we
still find a gender wage gap.
At the bottom line, when using two different panel
datasets of young workers in Switzerland, we find a re-
sidual wage gap of 3–6 per cent in favour of men.
wage gap total: 4.9* (p=0.02)
explained part: -1.4 (p=0.65)
unexplained part: 3.5* (p=0.01)
educational certif.: -0.5
job characteristics: 4.0*
experience: 0.3
parent. anticipation: 0.2
human capital: 1.8
field of study: -0.8
general background: 0.1
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Figure 2. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the gender wage gap (in percentage points)
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Translated into annual wages, this means that young
women lose out on half a monthly wage each year in com-
parison to young men with the same productive character-
istics. This result is consistent with the findings from other
European studies that report net wage penalties for young
women of 5–10 per cent (Francesconi and Parey) or 6 per
cent in Germany (Ochsenfeld, 2014), 7 per cent in
Switzerland (Bertschy et al., 2014, Korber 2019: 113), 8
per cent in Britain (Manning and Swaffield, 2008), and 10
per cent in Finland (Napari, 2009). Our findings suggest
that the gender wage gap remains constant over the first
few years of careers as wages evolve in parallel for young
men and women.
Clearly, the household division of labour does not
explain ‘basically all the gender wage gap’ (Polachek,
2006: p. 27) and the gender wage gap cannot be reduced
to a family wage gap between men and mothers. Of
course, the gendered division of labour in households
with children strongly penalizes mothers’ careers and
wages—the evidence is clear for the United States (Budig
and England, 2001), Western Europe (Gangl and Ziefle,
2009) as well as for Switzerland (Oesch et al., 2017).
However, this is only part of the story. Our data suggest
that young women earn lower wages than young men
having comparable skills and working in comparable
jobs long before they have children.
In the social sciences, scholars have become increas-
ingly cautious in inferring discrimination from observa-
tional data. An unexplained wage gap of 3–6 per cent per
se does not provide conclusive evidence for discrimin-
ation. However, to the extent that our two cohort studies
provide us with homogenous samples and detailed meas-
ures of intellectual capacity, educational credentials, and
labour market characteristics, we are hard pressed to find
another plausible explanation. In this context, the US
Supreme Court had ruled in 1977 that ‘where gross statis-
tical disparities can be shown, they alone may in a proper
case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice
of discrimination’ (Meier, 1986: p. 271).
Without an experimental design or firm-level data,
we refrain from making such a strong statement. It
should, however, be noted that the unexplained wage
gap may not only overstate the extent of discrimination
(if men have higher unmeasured productivity). It may
also understate its extent if women have better unmeas-
ured characteristics such as social skills or if an explana-
tory variable such as work experience, executive status
or type of occupation have themselves been affected by
discrimination (Blau and Kahn, 2017: p. 832).
Gary Becker (1957) made the famous prediction that
discriminatory employers would eventually be priced out of
the market in competitive labour markets. Over the period
of our study, the Swiss labour market has been close to full
employment and remains much less regulated in terms of la-
bour law and collective bargaining than its neighbours
Austria, Germany, France, or Italy. Yet although
Switzerland has one of Europe’s most competitive labour
markets, we still find an unexplained gender wage gap of 3–
6 per cent. The expectation that market forces will gradual-
ly eliminate the unequal treatment of men and women
therefore seems overly optimistic. The invisible hand of the
market has not done the job so far. It may now be time to
rely more strongly on the visible hand of equal pay policies.
Notes
1 For the United Kingdom, see the Telegraph ‘The gen-
der pay gap is about motherhood. Everything else
is just noise’, Zoe Strimpel, 7. 4. 2017. For the US,
see VOX ‘A stunning chart shows the true cause of
the gender wage gap: the gender wage gap is really a
child care penalty’, Sara Kliff, 19. 2. 2018. For
Switzerland see: Avenir Suisse ‘Gleichstellung,
warum der Arbeitsmarkt nicht versagt’ [Equal gen-
der rights, why the labour market does not fail],
November 2015.
2 Note that this arrangement was enshrined in
Switzerland’s marriage law until 1988, giving hus-
bands the status as legal head of family from whom
wives needed the consent in order to take on paid
employment.
3 Note that in Switzerland over 75 per cent of chil-
dren are born to married couples in the 2010s
(Swiss Federal Office of Statistics).
4 We are able to impute some missing data by assign-
ing the value of the precedent year to a missing
value if the information in the waves before and
after a missing data point indicates no change.
Additional analyses show that our results remain
unchanged if we omit some of the control variables
with many missing observations and analyze the
models with a larger sample.
5 Wages and working hours are self-reported.
Respondents could either specify the gross wage
(76.3 per cent) or net wage (24.6 per cent). Further,
they were asked whether they earn a monthly (89.3
per cent) or an hourly (10.7 per cent) wage.
Additional wage components like a 13th monthly
wage were included. The working hours are actual
working hours and therefore include over-time
work.
6 This method has the advantage that it prevents pos-
sible misspecifications of the propensity score
model which could increase the bias on observed
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variables post-matching (see Hainmueller, 2012;
Diamond and Sekhon, 2013). Our matching is
done for individuals in the final sample. For all the
different matching weights produced, all covariates
are balanced on the third order of moment.
7 Cultural capital was measured as an index combin-
ing the frequency with which parents visited muse-
ums, theaters, and classical concerts with their
children.
8 Educational certificates are differentiated into 11
categories. For the initial matching, we use four
variables on educational certificate: the first and se-
cond educational certificate at the upper secondary
level as well as the first and second certificate at the
tertiary level. We use a 14-category variable to de-
scribe the field of education of the first and second
educational certificate at the upper secondary and a
10-category variable for the tertiary level. In the
matching procedure, we also consider the number
of certificates respondents achieved before entering
the labour market.
9 Additionally, we control for the canton of the firm,
size of the firm, working hours per week, number
of subordinates, permanent or fixed-term contract,
night shifts and week-end shifts, the way the salary
is reported (hourly/monthly) and the month and
year they entered the labour market.
10 The Stata syntax of the analysis is available at the
GESIS datorium: https://datorium.gesis.org
Supplementary Data
Supplementary data are available at ESR online.
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Appendix
Table A1. Robustness checks for model 4, Table 1. Dependent variable: (log) monthly earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full model Full model Full model Full model Full model Full model Full model
Female 0.036* 0.038* 0.043** 0.038** 0.027 0.064*** 0.035
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018)
Experience in months 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.036***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Female  Experience 0.005 0.003 0.007* 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Constant 8.510*** 8.499*** 8.272*** 8.340*** 8.378*** 8.252*** 8.521***
(0.145) (0.147) (0.107) (0.109) (0.107) (0.131) (0.132)
Nobservations /
Nindividuals
3,524 / 1,781 3,178 / 1,613 3,465 / 1,758 3,438 / 1,743 3,524 / 1,781 3,524 / 1,781 3,524 / 1,781
Sampling weights Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Matching on
characteristics of :
Women Women Women Women Women Men Women
Model RE RE RE RE RE RE Bootstrapping
Exclusion of
observations
No Influential
weights
Outliers
in salary
Influential
observations
No No No
Standard errors in parentheses: *P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001.
See Table 1 for information on the models.
Model 2: Weights above 30 or below 0.03 were excluded.
Model 3: Wages above or below 1.5 times interquartile difference were excluded.
Model 4: Observations with a student residual below 3 or above þ3 were excluded.
Model 5: Coefficient female: P¼0.071.
Model 7: Bootstrapping (1,000 replications) of matching procedure and RE model, coefficient female: P¼0.051.
Table A2. The effect of work experience on (log) monthly earnings for men and women (fixed-effects coefficients with
matching)
Baseline
model
Channel 1:
Initial potential
Channel 2:
Labour market
Channel 3: Parenthood
anticipation
Final model
Model 0.2 1.4 2.3 3.1 4
Matched on – All All All All
Independent variables – – All labour market variables Marriage All
Experience in years 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.036*** 0.061*** 0.040***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Female x Experience 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.001
(0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Constant 8.282*** 8.234*** 20.68 8.229*** 20.66
(0.005) (0.011) (13917071) (0.010) (14684144)
Standard error in parentheses, þP<0.1, *P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001.
Nindividuals ¼ 1,781, Nobservations ¼ 3,524.
See Table 1 for information on the models.
All time-varying independent variables are interacted with gender.
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